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STATUTORY RIGHTS AND PREDISPUTE
AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE IN
CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")' cre-
ated substantive federal law2 governing arbitration agreements. 3
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Contemporaneous commentators discussing
the FAA proposed that "[tihe evils which arbitration [was] intended to correct [were] three
in number: (1) the long delay usually incident to a [court] proceeding... [;] (2) the expense
of litigation[;] (3) the failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world." Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 269 (1926).
2 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). The FAA applies to an agree-
ment to arbitrate in a "maritime transaction" or a "contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). "The effect of ... section [two] is to create a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).
3 In its broadest sense, arbitration is "the reference of a dispute to an impartial third
person chosen by the parties to the dispute who agree, in advance, to abide by the arbitra-
tor's award issued after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard."
MARTIN DohiKE, DOmKE ON COMMERciLL ARBrrRATION Practice Guide § 3:02 (Gabriel M.
Wilner ed., rev. ed. 1984). "An arbitration can validly take place only if the parties have
specifically and expressly agreed to use this method for settlement of their disputes." Id. §
1:01; see Goldberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Agreements
to arbitrate are essentially creatures of contract."); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (7th
Cir.) ("right and duty to arbitrate is a matter of contractual agreement"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1037 (1984).
As compared to litigation, arbitration allows the parties the "opportunity to define the
scope and content of the process as well as to control its procedures" and to choose the
arbitrator who will decide the dispute. Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights
Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL.
157, 160 (1989); see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: the Case of Arbitration
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 263-69 (1990) [hereinafter Stempel, Pitfalls] (compar
ing arbitration and adjudication). The fact finding procedures utilized depend upon the
agreement between the parties and are usually less formal and less complex than the discov-
ery procedures of litigation. Speidel, supra, at 160. In addition, the "timing, duration and
complexity of the [arbitration] hearings" are controlled by the parties and are not subject to
the scheduling problems of litigation. Id. Moreover, arbitrators are generally expected to be
experts in the underlying field and may not be required to render written decisions. Id. at
161. Confidentiality is normally maintained. Id. Precedent and potential effects on third
parties from the decision are of less concern to arbitrators, as the arbitrator's focus is on
reaching a "just result between the parties" not on "foster[ing] substantive consistency and
predictable results for the future." Id. Finally, compromise results are allowed in arbitration
as opposed to the all or nothing results in litigation. Id. Arbitration procedures drafted by
the American Arbitration Association are widely incorporated into contracts as the proce-
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Embodying what was later described as a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration,"4 the FAA guarantees that agreements to ar-
bitrate are as enforceable as any other contract clause5 and regu-
lates the interpretation6 and enforcement 7 of such agreements. The
dures to be followed in arbitration. The Center for Public Resources has drafted a model
predispute arbitration agreement for use in employment contracts and model procedures for
use when arbitrating employment claims. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AGREEMENT AND PROCEDURE (Ctr. for Pub. Resources, Inc. 1990). Comments concerning the
effectiveness of the arbitration process in protecting statutory rights have been varied and
widespread. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When
is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts? 68 TEx. L. REv. 509,
511 n.10 (1990) (summarizing recent literature debating effectiveness of arbitration).
' Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. Two objectives of this policy have been identi-
fied: "(1) to enforce contracts to arbitrate and (2) to promote arbitration as an efficient
system of dispute resolution." Speidel, supra note 3, at 186.
5 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (making arbitration provisions "valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable"). The purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts." H.R. REP. No. 96, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); see Scherk v.
Albert-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (1974).
a Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). In Prima
Paint, the Court established that an arbitration agreement is "separable" from the underly-
ing contract. Id. at 402. The Court relied on the provisions of section four of the FAA,
directing a court to "order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that 'the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in
issue.'" Id. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (alterations in original)). As a result, the
Court held that the FAA limited a court's inquiry to claims concerning the "making and
performance of the agreement to arbitrate," and not the contract in general. Id. at 403-04;
see Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1323-24 (1985) (discussing Prima Paint doctrine); cf. Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1377, 1456-59 (1991) (criticiz-
ing Prima Paint doctrine).
For determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, "state law, whether of
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that
takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue. . ." contra-
venes the FAA. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987); see Duplan Corp. v. W.B.
Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (FAA does not create federal
law on contract formation); cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stan-
ford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (holding agreement to arbitrate binding as a matter of
federal law although parties may contract to have arbitration governed by state rules).
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself, or
an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25; see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985) (requiring agreements to arbitrate be "rigorously enforce[d]"). Nevertheless,
parties may shield specific claims from the arbitration in their contract. See Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (noting party may ex-
clude statutory claim from agreement to arbitrate); Goldberg, 912 F.2d at 1420 (federal se-
curities claim excluded from arbitration agreement).
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-16 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Judicial proceedings are stayed where the
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FAA applies to contracts within the admiralty and commerce pow-
ers of Congress,8 but contains a specific exclusion for contracts of
employment.9 Whether this exclusion applies to all contracts of
employment, or is limited to a class of employees transporting
goods in interstate commerce, is the subject of disagreement
among the federal courts. 10
court finds the issue arbitrable under the parties agreement. Id. § 3. If the court discerns a
"failure, neglect, or refusal" to honor a valid agreement to arbitrate, the FAA directs the
court to order the parties to proceed to arbitration. Id. § 4. The FAA also governs the ap-
pointment and authority of the arbitrator. Id. § 5 (discussing appointment of arbitrators);
id. § 7 (discussing arbitrator's power to compel attendance of witness). In addition, the FAA
specifies the mechanism for confirming awards and converting them to judgments. Id. § 9.
Finally, a court may vacate an award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. 1 1990). For a discussion of the preclusive effect of arbitral awards in
subsequent litigation, see Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using
Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TuL. L. REv. 29, 80-81 (1988) (summarizing
current case by case approach to arbitral collateral estoppel and proposing rule that "arbi-
tral findings never have collateral estoppel effect, unless the arbitration agreement clearly
and expressly provides for it"); Shell, supra note 3, at 539 (1990) (reviewing res judicata and
collateral estoppel effects of arbitration and arguing that contractual intent should guide
preclusion analysis); Speidel, supra note 3, at 198-204 (reviewing claim and issue preclusion
of arbitration awards).
8 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405. At the time the FAA was passed, the under-
lying congressional authority was not firmly established, as Congress believed it was pos-
sessed of the power to create rules of decision in state and federal court. See Hirshman,
supra note 6, at 1314. Commentators advanced the view that "[the primary purpose of the
statute is to make enforceable in the Federal courts... agreements for arbitration, and for
this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of
the Federal courts." Cohen & Dayton, supra note 1, at 277-78. The Supreme Court declined
to view the FAA as procedural and established that the FAA is founded on Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce and admiralty. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405; see
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (Act rests on authority to "enact
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause"). The proposition that "[flederal law in the
terms of the Arbitration Act governs [arbitrability] in either state or federal court" is now
firmly established. See Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see generally Hirshman,
supra note 6 (reviewing Supreme Court cases establishing FAA as governing law in state
courts).
9 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); see supra notes 63 to 90 and accompanying text (discussing FAA
exclusion for employment contracts).
10 See supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
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In addition to this statutory exclusion, in Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co." the Supreme Court created a public policy excep-
tion to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate certain claims
arising under federal statutes. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held
that an employee does not waive the right to judicial resolution of
a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by submit-
ting the claim to the grievance arbitration procedures established
by a collective bargaining agreement. 12 Subsequently, lower courts
expanded this exception and refused to enforce predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate federal statutory claims. 13
Recently, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'4 the
Court clarified the holding in Gardner-Denver by explaining that
Gardner-Denver only applied to collective bargaining situations.' 5
" 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
12 Id. at 59-60.
13 See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (ruling that
employee cannot prospectively waive right to judicial forum for Title VII claim in employ-
ment agreement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1945 (1990); Home v. New England Patriots Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D. Mass. 1980) (denying stay of judicial proceeding
since arbitration can not dispose of discrimination claim).
" 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
" Id. at 1656-57. "Arbitration is roughly divided into commercial and labor arbitra-
tion." Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 3, at 266; see Shell, supra note 3, at 512 (noting that
fundamental differences between labor and commercial arbitration have led to two models
of arbitration). Established by a contract between the parties, commercial arbitration is
viewed as an inexpensive, cheaper, more efficient alternative to judicial resolution of a dis-
pute between the parties. See DOMKE, supra note 3, § 1:01, at 1; see generally THOMAS
OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1987) (discussing practice and procedure in commercial
arbitration); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990's (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1990) (sur-
veying current federal arbitration law). Commercial arbitration is not limited to commercial
transactions, but is also used to resolve controversies arising out of individual employment
contracts, license agreements, partnerships, leases, and many other situations. See DOMKE,
supra note 3, § 1:01 at 3, see also Shell, supra note 3, at 531 (commercial arbitration used in
securities industry to resolve employee and customer claims); OEHMKE, supra, § 2:3, at 20
(identifying 24 subject matter areas where arbitration is prevalent).
Labor arbitration, on the other hand, arises within the grievance resolution machinery
erected under collective bargaining agreements where the arbitration procedure "is a form
of 'continuous bargaining' between unions and employers that permits the resolution of dis-
putes to proceed without interrupting the ongoing relationship between these two interde-
pendent parties." Shell, supra note 3, at 517; see generally THOMAS OEIHMKE, EMPLOYMENT
LABOR AND PENSION ARBITRATION (1989) (discussing practice and procedure in labor arbitra-
tion); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985) (same); HENRY H.
PERRITT, JR, EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1987) (discussing employ-
ment law and arbitration).
Comparatively, commercial arbitration exists as a substitute for litigation, while labor
arbitration is a "substitute for industrial strife." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The Supreme Court consistently has maintained
this basic distinction. See Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 3, at 266 n.16; see also Shell, supra
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In addition, the Court in Gilmer confirmed the adequacy of arbi-
tration procedures for resolving statutory claims"6 and held that an
employee may waive the right to judicial resolution of a federal age
discrimination claim by signing a third party arbitration agree-
ment.17 Nevertheless, the Court did not decide to what extent the
FAA was applicable to employment contracts. 8 Thus, since em-
ployees may prospectively waive the right to judicial resolution of
federal statutory claims after Gilmer, the lower courts are faced
with the unresolved question of what substantive law governs the
interpretation and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate such
claims contained in individual contracts of employment.
This Note analyzes the extent to which the FAA governs indi-
vidual contracts of employment. Part One will discuss the Gilmer
Court's limitation of Gardner-Denver to collective bargaining
agreements and present the unresolved issue of what law applies to
arbitration provisions in individual contracts of employment. 9
Part Two will analyze the statutory exception in the FAA and con-
clude that Congress intended to exclude all employment contracts
from the FAA.20 Finally, Part Three will propose that absent fed-
eral guidelines for interpreting arbitration clauses in individual
employment contracts, state substantive law should apply.2 '
I. LIMITATION IMPOSED ON GARDNER-DENVER BY GILMER
In Gardner-Denver, a discharged union member filed a griev-
ance under the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer claiming "unjust discharge." 2 During the final
step in the arbitration process the employee added, for the first
time, a claim of racial discrimination relating to his discharge.23
The nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining agree-
ment prohibited racial discrimination in language similar to that in
Title VII.24 Without mentioning the discrimination claim, the labor
note 3, at 511-14 (summarizing distinctions made by Supreme Court).
11 Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1654-56.
17 Id. at 1649.
11 Id. at 1651 n.2.
19 See infra notes 22-62 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 63-130 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text.
22 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the em-
ployer retained the right to fire employees "for proper cause." Id.
23 Id. at 42.
21 Id. at 39. The collective bargaining agreement provided that "there shall be no dis-
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arbitrator found that the employee was "discharged for just
cause."
25
Subsequently, the employee filed a Title VII claim against his
employer in district court based on the same factual situation.2"
Although the lower courts held that the labor arbitrator's decision
foreclosed the Title VII action, the Supreme Court reversed.2 The
Court reasoned that Title VII created statutory rights distinct and
separate from contract rights under a collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 In addition, the Court viewed the labor arbitration process
as an inadequate substitute for judicial protection of these statu-
tory rights.29 Thus, the Court concluded that the employee may
pursue a remedy under a collective bargaining agreement and also
maintain a claim under Title VII 0
After Gardner-Denver, it was clear that the Supreme Court
considered arbitration procedures to be inferior to judicial proce-
crhnination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
ancestry." Id. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on "race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1988).
25 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 42.
26 Id. at 43. The employee filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission prior to the arbitration hearing. Id. at 42. The complaint was referred to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which "determined that there was not rea-
sonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII ... had occurred." Id. at 42-43. After
receiving notice of his right to sue from the Commission, the employee filed the discrimina-
tion claim in district court. Id.
27 Id. at 43. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision barring the claim
on election of remedies and waiver theories. Id. at 45.
28 Id. at 47-50. Although the language of the collective bargaining agreement and Title
VII were coextensive, the Court made a distinction between contract rights under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and statutory rights under Title VII. Id. at 49-50. "In submitting
his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual rights under a
collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an em-
ployee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress." Id. Relying on this dis-
tinction, the Court dismissed claims that the present suit was foreclosed based on election of
remedies or waiver rationales. Id. at 49-52.
9 Id. at 56. Focusing on the adequacy of labor arbitration proceedings to guarantee
rights provided by Congress, the Court stated that the arbitrator's authority derives from
the contract and an arbitrator's task is to "effectuate the intent of the parties rather than
the requirements of enacted legislation." Id. at 56-57. The arbitrator's competence pertains
to the "law of the shop, not the law of the land." Id. at 57. In addition, arbitral factfinding
"is not equivalent to judicial factfinding." Id. Moreover, arbitration's informality allows the
procedure to function efficiently, inexpensively and expeditiously, but such characteristics
make it less appropriate for the resolution of statutory claims. Id. at 58. Finally, since the
union controls the "manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented," a
court cannot assume that the interests of the union and employee are coextensive. Id. at 58
n.19.
.. Id. at 59-60.
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dures as a mechanism for protecting federal statutory rights.31 The
Court believed that Congress intended judicial, rather than arbi-
tral, enforcement of these statutes as they encompassed matters of
broad public concern.32 In later cases, the Supreme Court extended
31 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that federal securities claims
are not arbitrable), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989); American Safety Equip. Co. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828
(2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claim inappropriate for arbitration).
In Wilko, a customer of a brokerage house filed a claim under the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act") seeking damages for alleged misrepresentations by the brokerage house con-
cerning a purchased security. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. Claiming that the arbitration provi-
sion in a margin agreement between the parties controlled the issue, the brokerage house
moved to stay the trial pursuant to the FAA until an arbitration could be had. Id. at 429. In
deciding the issue, the Court identified the tension between the policies of the 1933 Act and
the FAA, and weighed the 1933 Act more heavily. Id. at 438. The Court reasoned that the
1933 Act was designed to protect investors and "created a special right to recover for mis-
representation which differ[ed] substantially from the common-law action." Id. at 431. The
Court held that the "right to select the judicial forum" to prosecute these claims could not
be waived. Id. at 435. Further, the Court explained that the "effectiveness in application [of
the provisions of the 1933 Act was] lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceed-
ings," and arbitration lacked the certainty of a judicial proceeding. Id. at 432, 435. In addi-
tion, since arbitrators were not required to explain the reasons underlying an award or
maintain a complete record of the proceedings, "the arbitrators' conception of the legal
meaning of such statutory requirements as 'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material
fact,'... [could not] be examined." Id. at 436. Finally, the Court found the available proce-
dures for reviewing an arbitral award much narrower than judicial review procedures and
inadequate to serve the purposes of the 1933 Act. Id. at 436-37.
In deciding the arbitrability of an antitrust claim, the Second Circuit in American
Safety explained that antitrust statutes were "designed to promote the national interest in a
competitive economy." American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826. The court believed that Congress
intended antitrust claims to be resolved solely by the judiciary and held that antitrust
claims were inappropriate for arbitration. Id. at 827-28. Although the opinion in American
Safety did not clearly establish the rationale for its holding, at least five arguments have
been offered to support the opinion:
(1) Complexity (courts are more competent than arbitrators to resolve antitrust
claims); (2) Hostility (arbitrators are less likely to enforce antitrust laws vigor-
ously); (3) Deterrence (judicial resolution will provide more deterrence through
more widely disseminated legal precedent); (4) Public Concern (antitrust law's
purpose is to protect the public and competition rather than the contracting par-
ties); (5) Adhesion (contracts containing applicable arbitration clauses are likely to
be contracts of adhesion).
Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 3, at 297 (footnotes omitted). See generally Speidel, supra
note 3, at 179-91 (summarizing rise and fall of public policy exceptions in antitrust and
securities litigation).
312 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 182-83 (recognizing American Safety as "'high water
mark' of the public policy defense"); Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 3,.at 284 (certain disputes
reserved for judicial forum). "[Tihe result [in Wilko] was predicated upon the Court's as-
sessment [of congressional purpose in enacting the 1933 Act] ... and.., this assessment, in
turn, was influenced by considerations of both arbitral effectiveness and appropriateness."
Speidel, supra note 3, at 180.
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the rationale set forth in Gardner-Denver and allowed trial de
novo of wage claims under the Fair Labor Standard Act 3 and
claims based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' 4 Lower courts, in
applying Gardner-Denver, allowed employees direct access to the
judicial forum without first requiring them to exhaust the arbitra-
tion remedy.3 5 In addition, lower courts extended the holding be-
yond collective bargaining to non-union situations in which the
agreement to arbitrate was contained in an individual contract of
employment.3 6
More recently, in Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that an ar-
bitration clause in a securities representative's application to the
New York Stock Exchange was enforceable by the representative's
employer to compel arbitration of a federal age discrimination
claim.37 At the outset, the Court decided that the registration ap-
plication was not part of an employment contract, thus the FAA
governed the motion to compel arbitration.' After establishing
33 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1978 & Supp. 1991); see Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742-46 (1981) (holding federal wage claim not barred by prior
submission to contractual dispute resolution procedure).
34 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288
(1984). Adhering to the mistrust of arbitration procedures for guaranteeing statutory rights
established in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, the Court in McDonald concluded that "ac-
cording preclusive effect to arbitration awards in § 1983 actions would severely undermine
the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to protect." Id. at 290-92.
" See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
Gardner-Denver does not mandate arbitration before judicial resolution of civil rights
claim), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); see also Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l,
858 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir. 1988) (providing judicial forum for Title VII and state law
discrimination claims), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot
and Mannini P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597, 604 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (dismissing motion to stay ADEA
claim pending arbitration based on Gardner-Denver). Compare Shell, supra note 3, at 566-
69 (criticizing Utley's unprincipled reliance on Gardner-Denver) and Laura R. Hillock,
Comment, Arbitration of Title VII and Parallel State Discrimination Claims: A Proposal,
27 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 193-96 (1990-91) (criticizing Swenson's reliance on Gardner-Denver
and proposing amendment to Title VII to allow arbitration) with Michael Lieberman, Com-
ment, Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: The Triumph of
Substantive Over Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC, Int'l, Inc., 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1817, 1822 (1990) (supporting Swenson's reliance on Gardner-Denver and proposing pre-
sumption against arbitrability of claims under discrimination statutes).
11 See, e.g., Utley, 883 F.2d at 187 (ruling that employee cannot prospectively waive
judicial forum in employment agreement); Home v. New England Patriots Football Club,
489 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D. Mass. 1980) (ruling stay of judicial proceeding improper where
arbitration would not dispose of discrimination claim).
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657.
'8 Id. at 1651 n.2. The Court established that the arbitration clause was contained in
Gilmer's registration application with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Id. at 1650.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation ("Interstate") sought to enforce this provision because
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that the broad arbitration clause in the application encompassed
age discrimination claims, 39 the Court examined whether the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")' 0 precluded
arbitration.
Noting that neither the text nor the legislative history of the
ADEA precluded arbitration,41 the Court held that there was no
inherent conflict between the underlying purpose of the ADEA and
arbitration.42 The Court reasoned that the goals of the ADEA,43
encompassing important social policies,44 were achieved through
both private suits and Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
the rules of the NYSE required the arbitration of all employment claims between registered
representatives and "member organizations," which included Interstate. Id. at 1650-51.
Even though Interstate required Gilmer to register with the NYSE as a condition of em-
ployment, id. at 1650, the Court treated the arbitration provision as one arising from a
contract with the NYSE, and not from an employment contract with Interstate, id. at 1651
n.2. Previous cases had intimated that applications to the NYSE, required as a prerequisite
to employment, constituted part of an employment contract. See, e.g., Morgan v. Smith
Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163, 1165-67 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing NYSE
application as part of employment contract); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 784-85 (1st
Cir. 1971) (same). By holding that an arbitration clause in a securities registration applica-
tion with a securities exchange was a contract with the exchange and not part of a "contract
of employment," the Court impliedly held that cases dealing with such clauses in the securi-
ties industry should not be used as authority when examining an arbitration clause in an
employment contract. Id. The court noted that lower courts consistently have applied the
FAA to arbitration clauses in registration applications for this reason. Id. Subsequently, the
Fifth Circuit focused on the fact that, in Gilmer, the arbitration clause was stated in a
contract between the employee and a securities exchange, not the employer, and warned
that "courts should be mindful of this potential issue in future cases." Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 n.* (5th Cir. 1991).
" Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. 1650-51. The arbitration clause in the registration application pro-
vided that Gilmer " 'agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between
him and Interstate 'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-
laws of the organizations with which [he] register[ed]."' Id. at 1650. The Court added that
NYSE Rule 347 required arbitration of "'[a]ny controversy between a registered represen-
tative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termina-
tion of employment of such registered representative.'" Id. at 1651 (citation omitted). The
Court assumed that the arbitration clause covered federal age discrimination claims without
further discussion.
" 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
41 Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
42 See id. at 1652.
43 See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). The purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than their age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." Id.
"' See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988). Congressional findings noted that older workers were
disadvantaged in the workplace due to their age and that older workers were increasingly
among the unemployed. Id.
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sion ("EEOC") actions45 and that these goals were nevertheless
also effectuated through arbitration. 4" Furthermore, the Court de-
termined that compulsory arbitration would not undermine the
EEOC's role in enforcing the ADEA, since the EEOC is empow-
ered with plenary authority to investigate and prosecute age dis-
crimination claims. 47 Finally, the Court added that involvement of
the EEOC is not required for private settlement of ADEA claims. 48
Following a recent pro-arbitration trend,49 the Court reaf-
45 See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652. ADEA allows for private suit sixty days after charge
first filed with EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)-(d) (1988).
46 See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653. "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637) (alterations in original).
47 Id.
48 Id.
40 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1989) (overruling precedent requiring litigation of securities claims); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987) (refusing to extend public policy excep-
tion to arbitration to claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985) (criticizing public policy
exception to arbitration for antitrust claims); supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text
(summarizing earlier public policy exceptions to arbitration).
In Rodriguez de Quijas, the question before the Court was "whether a predispute
agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 [was] unenforceable, requir-
ing resolution of the claims only in a judicial forum." Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478.
The Court reviewed the decision in Wilko v. Swan and concluded that the reasoning in
Wilko was influenced by "judicial hostility" towards arbitration. Id. at 480. This view, the
Court established, no longer reflected the attitude of the Court towards arbitration. Id. at
481. "To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening
the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far
out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method
of resolving disputes." Id. at 481. The Court proceeded to explicitly overrule Wilko and
enforce the predispute agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 485; see also Stempel, Pitfalls, supra
note 3, at 295 (noting that Court in Rodriguez de Quijas recognized that Wilko relied on
public policy and not statutory construction).
In Mitsubishi, the Court was presented with the question "whether an American court
should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement
arises from an international transaction." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624. The Court "[found] it
unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine as applied to agree-
ments to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions" as the Court would enforce this arbi-
tration clause in an international transaction "even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context." Id. at 629. Nevertheless, the Court reviewed the
individual concerns underlying the American Safety doctrine and rejected each of them as a
basis for invalidating an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 632-33.
Although the Court has retreated from public policy exceptions and rejected some pre-
vious applications entirely, several Justices still adhere to them. See Stempel, Pitfalls,
supra note 3, at 284; see also Speidel, supra note 3, at 190-01 (summarizing conclusions in
favor of arbitration from Court's recent cases).
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firmed the adequacy of arbitration procedures for resolving federal
statutory claims by reiterating that an individual forgoes no sub-
stantive rights by submitting a claim to arbitrationY° Traditional
criticisms of the arbitration process concerning bias,51 limited dis-
52 * 53covery, unwritten opinions, and the inability to obtain equitable
relief or maintain class actions54 were summarily dismissed. Addi-
tionally, the Court noted that claims of procedural inadequacies
and those of unequal bargaining power should be decided on a
case-by-case basis.55
Although the employee asserted preclusion of arbitration
based on Gardner-Denver and its progeny,56 the Court distin-
guished those cases on three grounds. First, those cases decided
"whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subse-
quent judicial resolution of statutory claims" and did not consider
whether an agreement to arbitrate a federal statutory claim could
be enforced.57 Second, the tension in the arbitration proceedings
under a collective bargaining agreement between the individual's
interests and those of the union did not exist in Gilmer.8 Third,
those cases were not decided pursuant to the FAA. 9 Significantly,
the Court also stated that the "mistrust" of arbitration, noted in
Gardner-Denver, no longer held sway with the Court.60
I" See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652. The Supreme Court has "recognized that '[b]y agree-
ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.'"
Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628).
51 See id. at 1654. The Court explained that the NYSE rules, requiring disclosure of an
arbitrator's background, employment history, and potential biases, and the FAA procedures
for judicial review adequately protected against potential bias. Id. at 1654.
12 See id. at 1654-55. In dismissing the discovery restrictions, the Court emphasized the
minimal discovery usually required in an ADEA suit, the efficiency and informality gained
in arbitration, and the fact that arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence. Id.
11 See id. at 1655. The NYSE rules required the arbitrator to issue a written opinion
that would be open to inspection by the public. Id.
11 Id. The Court explained that the NYSE rules allowed for such actions and that the
EEOC was not foreclosed from "bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief."
Id.
"5 See id. at 1655-56; see also Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CAhwozo L. REv. 481, 486-87 (1981) (sug-
gesting agreements to arbitrate in adhesion contracts unenforceable).
"I Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. at 1656.
17 Id. at 1657.
" Id.
Id.
o Id. at 1656 n.5. But see Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Reso-
lution, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1, 54 (1987) (noting substantive law lost in procedural emphasis of
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Reasoning from these distinctions, it is submitted that courts
may no longer refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims in individual contracts of employment on public policy
grounds. The strong statements in favor of arbitration in Gilmer
and the explicit limitation of Gardner-Denver to collective bar-
gaining agreements, coupled with the holding in Gilmer that an
employee may waive the right to a judicial forum by signing a
predispute arbitration agreement, provide for broad enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate. Indeed, two circuit courts have com-
pelled arbitration of Title VII claims in the wake of the Court's
holding in Gilmer.1
Although the Court in Gilmer relied on the FAA to allow
waiver of the judicial forum, the Court specifically avoided the
question concerning the scope of the FAA exclusion for contracts
of employment.2 As a result, this question must be resolved to de-
termine what substantive law governs the interpretation and en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate contained in individual con-
tracts of employment.
II. STATUTORY EXCLUSION FOR CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT
Although the FAA applies to any agreement to arbitrate con-
tained in a "maritime transaction" or a "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce,"6 section one of the Act provides
that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."64 The Supreme Court
has never interpreted this language,65 even though the question
concerning the scope of the exclusion has been briefed and
presented to the Court on two occasions.6 6 Lower courts have dis-
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms).
61 See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims); Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Any broad public policy argu-
ments against [subjecting Title VII claims to arbitration] .. . were necessarily rejected by
Gilmer.").
62 Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 n.2.
63 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
0. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6 See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2 (stating that issue reserved for "another day").
" See id. at 1658-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 466-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Court "glaringly ignore[d]" FAA);
see also Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions Amicus Curie in Support of Petitioner at 16 n.2; Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1647 (noting
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agreed over the interpretation of the exclusionary language "any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."
67
A. Judicial Interpretation
The Third Circuit's opinion in Tenney Engineering v. United
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers6 s represents the prevailing
view for a narrow interpretation of the exclusion.6 9 In Tenney En-
gineering, the plaintiff, a manufacturing corporation, alleged that
the defendant, a labor union, violated the collective bargaining
agreement through initiation of a strike by the plaintiff's employ-
ees.70 The union moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA
because the collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitra-
tion provision. 1
Construing the FAA exclusion narrowly, the Third Circuit re-
lied on the maxim ejusdem generis72 and Congress's narrow under-
current arguments based on arguments made in Lincoln Mills).
'T See Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404 (6th Cir. 1988) (not-
ing interpretation of section I subject to debate); American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 470-73 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing proper interpretation
of section one).
Courts initially debated whether collective bargaining agreements were contracts of em-'
ployment within the meaning of the FAA. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230
F.2d 81, 85-86 (5th Cir. 1956) (summarizing interpretations of "contracts of employment"),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). While holding specifically that "collective bargaining agreements
are 'contracts of employment' within the meaning of the exclusion" in section 1 of the FAA,
the court, in American Postal Workers, stated that the opposite position was a "distinctly
minority view" that could not be "cited with any confidence as the current view of any of
the federal courts of appeals." American Postal Workers, 823 F.2d at 473. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court stated that the FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements al-
though courts may look to the FAA for guidance when deciding labor arbitration cases
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987); see also Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Interna-
tional Chem. Workers Union, 853 F.2d 1310, 1315-16 (6th Cir. 1988) (excluding labor con-
tracts from FAA based on Misco).
The Supreme Court has taken a narrower approach when evaluating what constitutes
an individual employee's "contract of employment." See supra note 38.
68 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
68 See Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 405; American Postal Workers Union, 823 F.2d at 473.
Since courts have relied on the Labor Management Relations Act for resolving labor arbitra-
tion disputes post-Lincoln Mills, the scope of section one has not received much attention.
See Shell, supra note 3, at 527; Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VML. L. REV. 57, 64 (1987).
" Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 451.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 452. But see John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of
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standing of its commerce power in 1925.73 The court reasoned that
the general phrase in the exclusion, "any other class of workers,"
should be limited to the class of workers directly engaged in inter-
state commerce.74 Since seamen and railroad workers were so en-
gaged, the court believed that Congress intended to exclude only
workers "actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical
effect part of it."7 5
In addition, the court explained that Congress understood its
commerce power in 1925 to be limited to the narrow field of inter-
state transportation.7 6 Moreover, the court hypothesized that Con-
gress incorporated phraseology into the FAA similar to that con-
tained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, knowing
that the Supreme Court had recently interpreted the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act "to include only employees engaged in inter-
state transportation."'7 Finally, the court added that Congress
later continued to use the phrase "engaged in commerce" in a nar-
row sense while employing other, more precise language to exercise
broader commerce power and include "activities merely affecting
commerce" within a federal statute. s
As a result, since the workers in Tenney Engineering only
"engaged in the production of goods for subsequent sale in inter-
state commerce," they were not within the exclusion and the FAA
Method, 3 DALHOUSm L.J. 333, 360-63 (1976) (arguing that maxims should be invoked as
non-mandatory guides only after investigation of intent and context prove use appropriate).
7' Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 453.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 452. Since special arbitration legislation existed for seamen and railroad work-
ers, the court reasoned that the draftsmen "rounded out the exclusionary clause by exclud-
ing all other similar classes workers." Id. at 452-53.
It is only a partial answer to the allegation of inconsistency to say that Congress
enacted the exception... because there was already machinery for handling their
grievances. The [exclusion clearly applies] to truckers, many maintenance groups,
employees engaged in ordering and paying for interstate shipments, warehouse
employees where the interstate transit has not ended, etc. This is probably a
larger group numerically than the railroad and maritime workers. There was no
risk of duplication so far as they were concerned.
Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REv. 591, 599 n.27
(1954) (citation omitted).
78 Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 453.
77 Id.
78 Id. The court cited, as an example, the Fair Labor Standards Act which Congress
made applicable to employees "engaged in the production of goods for commerce" and not
merely those "engaged in commerce." Id.
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controlled.79 The majority of courts confronted with this issue have
adopted the holding of Tenney Engineering with limited indepen-
dent analysis. s°
The court in United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
v. Miller Metal Products,81 however, proposed a much broader in-
terpretation of the exclusion. In Miller Metal Products, the Fourth
Circuit, confronted with a situation factually similar to that in
Tenney Engineering,82 rejected the distinction drawn in that case
between workers producing goods for interstate commerce and
those transporting goods in interstate commerce.8 3 Instead, the
Fourth Circuit chose to rely on the structure of the statute and
reasoned that the exclusionary clause was meant to be co-extensive
with the statute's scope.84 Therefore, the court concluded that the
71 Id. at 453.
" See Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding securities indus-
try employee not covered by exclusion); Pietro Scalzetti Co. v. International Union of Oper-
ating Eng'rs, Local 150, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding collective bargaining
agreement in construction industry not within exclusion); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475,
United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956) (finding workers
manufacturing auto parts not within exclusion), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). While
most of these cases concerned collective bargaining agreements, this particular issue gener-
ally has not been analyzed differently when individual contracts of employment were at
issue. See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972)
(professional basketball player); Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785 (securities representative); see
also Ray, supra note 69, at 64 (discussing split among circuits in applying FAA to labor
arbitration). Explicitly addressing the issue of different treatment for individual contracts of
employment and collective bargaining agreements, the Sixth Circuit, in Willis v. Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991), after reviewing the legislative history of the
FAA, refused to conclude "that individual employment contracts involving employers en-
gaged in interstate commerce should be treated any differently" than collective bargaining
agreements. Id. at 311-12 (dictum). But see John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the
Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Predispute Mandatory Arbi-
tration as a Condition of Employment, 37 VML. L. REv. 113, 132-33 (predicting that reason-
ing in Gilmer will lead to Supreme Court limiting FAA exclusion to collective bargaining
agreements).
In addition, certain circuits have not conclusively interpreted the exclusionary language.
See Willis, 948 F.2d at 310-11 (exploring exclusionary clause in dictum); Bacashihua v.
United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988) (avoiding issue because postal
workers clearly engaged in interstate commerce); American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).
81 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
82 Id. at 222. As in Tenney Engineering, the employer filed an action seeking damages
from the labor union for breach of the no-strike provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. The union moved to stay the action and to compel arbitration pursuant to the
FAA. Id.
83 Id. at 224.
s See id.; see also Willis, 948 F.2d at 310-11 (dictum) (expressing view that term "com-
merce" should be read consistently when deciding jurisdiction of FAA and scope of
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exclusion reached to the fullest extent of Congress's commerce
power and held that the FAA could not be used to stay the judicial
proceedings."5
Consistent with the rationale in Miller Metal Products, it is
submitted that relying on Congress' narrow understanding of its
commerce power misstates the central focus of the inquiry into the
extent of the exclusion. Based on the structure of the statute, it is
proposed that the scope of the statute and the exclusion, in terms
of breadth, are linked and should be construed in harmony. Sec-
tion two extends the coverage of the statute to "written provi-
sion[s] in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy.""6 Section one
excludes from this definition "other class[es] of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. ' 87 It seems that Congress was not
endeavoring to create subtle distinctions between "involving com-
merce" and "engaged in commerce. '"88 Rather, by listing seamen
and railroad workers followed by a general exclusion, Congress in-
tended to remove all contracts of employment possibly falling
within its commerce power from the operation of the FAA. 9 Since
exclusion).
85 Id. The court referred to an earlier Fourth Circuit case which held that Congress
exercised the full extent of its commerce power under the FAA. Id. (citing Agostini Bros.
Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944)). Therefore, the court found "no
reason to think that it was not intended that the exception incorporated in the statute
should not reach also the full extent of [Congress'] power." Id.
as 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (emphasis added). The statute also governs such provisions in
"maritime transactions." Id.
87 Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
a See Cox, supra note 75, at 597-98 (noting subtle distinctions between "affecting com-
merce," "engaged in the production of goods for commerce" and engaged "in commerce" not
recognized by Congress in 1925). Professor Cox concluded that "[olne should not rely on one
policy in interpreting the phrases relating to commerce and an opposite conception in read-
ing 'contract of employment.'" Id. at 599; see also Herbert Burstein, The United States
Arbitration Act - A Reevaluation, 3 VILL. L. REv. 125, 133 (1958) (arguing that collective
bargaining agreement cannot be construed as "contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce"). But see Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Coming Home to Contract: Loosening the
Death-Grip of Statutorily Created Rights On Arbitration in the Non-Union World, 6 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 243, 256-58 (1991) (arguing that non-textual interpretation requires
broad construction of scope and narrow construction of exception).
89 See Cox, supra note 75, at 598. Although Professor Cox supported a narrow con-
struction of the exception, he stated that "it would seem equally accurate historically and
equally permissible textually to read... [the exclusion] either as coextensive with the con-
stitutional power of Congress... or else as limited to the few types of employment believed
subject to federal regulation in 1924." Id. at 598. In addition, Professor Cox concluded that
a broad scope and narrow exclusion would be permissible only if utilized to give effect to a
labor policy "favoring the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievances." Id. at 599.
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the FAA has been applied to reach any contract within the com-
merce power of Congress,90 the exception should be given an
equally broad sweep.
B. The Legislative History of the FAA
Although the legislative history specifically discussing the ex-
clusionary language has been labeled "ambiguous,"9 1 the history of
the FAA and the circumstances leading to its enactment indicate
that the FAA was intended only to cover commercial transactions.
The Act was drafted by the American Bar Association9 2 and was
modeled after the 1920 New York Arbitration Law.93 The Associa-
tion sought to overturn the common law rule of judicial hostility
towards arbitration94 and instructed the Committee on Commerce,
Slightly different reasoning was used in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d
305 (6th Cir. 1991), where the Sixth Circuit reviewed a factual situation similar to that in
Gilmer. Although the court ultimately followed Gilmer and held that the plaintiff's discrim-
ination claim was not exempt from her agreement to arbitrate because the agreement was
contained in a securities registration application and not a contract of -employment, in dic-
tum, the court cited Miller Metal Products and Professor Cox for the proposition that "the
same meaning for 'commerce' was meant to apply throughout the entire Act," including the
exclusion in section one. Id. at 310-11. The court then noted that the jurisdiction provisions
in Title VII and the ADEA, both enacted under the commerce power of Congress, provide a
Congressional determination that an "employer with 15 or more employees necessarily im-
plicates interstate commerce." Id. at 311. The court reasoned that any claims under Title
VII or the ADEA necessarily implicate commerce. Id. As a result, the court concluded that
employment contracts with employers subject to Title VII or similar anti-discrimination
laws would necessarily fall within the exclusion of the FAA for contracts of employment. Id.
Assuming, arguendo, that the reasoning in this dictum is correct, this falls short of a man-
date to preclude enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. See infra note
108 and accompanying text.
90 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (The FAA "provide[s] for the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.").
91 Local 205, United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85,
99 (1st Cir. 1956) (remarking that legislative history is of little aid in deciding whether col-
lective bargaining agreement was contract of employment), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S.
547 (1957); see Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, 235
F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The legislative history of the exclusionary clause in Section 1
is, at best, vague and inconclusive."), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
92 See 50 A.B.A. REP. 356-62 (1925)
91 See id.; Arbitration Law, ch. 275, [1920] N.Y. Laws 803 (current version at N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 7501 (McKinney 1992)); see also Burstein, supra note 88, at 131 (discussing
legislative history of the FAA).
" See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 1, at 265 (noting FAA reversed common law doc-
trine). Under common law, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were generally of little
value as courts refused to grant specific performance. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924) (federal courts denied specific performance); Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942) (discussing English
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Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association to
consider and report upon "the further extension of the principle of
commercial arbitration. '9 5
Initially introduced into Congress in 1922, the original draft
did not contain the exclusionary language.9 6 Andrew Furuseth,
President of the International Seamen's Union of America, vigor-
ously objected to the bill, claiming that it created a "compulsory
labor" bill.97 The American Federation of Labor also protested the
bill, later claiming that its protests led to the inclusion of the ex-
clusionary language. 8 When the bill was reintroduced in 1923, the
revised draft contained the exclusionary language,99 and the bill
passed with no additional resistance from labor. 100
The hearings and floor debate conducted on the amended bill
were devoid of labor participation. 1°1 The lack of interest by labor
organizations, combined with the focus on the commercial nature
of the bill in both the Senate and House Reports0 2 and the floor
and American common law doctrine and refusal to grant specific performance for agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes); see also WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AND AWARDS § 23, at 83 (1930) ("[S]pecific enforcement of future disputes agreements will
be denied in the absence of an enabling statute."). While an aggrieved party could sue for
breach of contract, the party could only recover a nominal sum for breach of an arbitration
clause. See Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 121; DoMKE, supra note 3, § 3:01. Non-enforcement
was premised on the view that such clauses served to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction"
and were "revocable" based on public policy. STURGES, supra, § 15 at 45. As such, courts
would not allow a party to plead the clause in abatement of a court action, but would allow
either party to terminate the arbitration agreement upon notice to the opposing party. See
id; see also Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983 (noting English hostility founded on desire to avoid
loss of income from fees); Stempel, Pitfalls, supra note 3, at 271-74 (summarizing English
and American judicial hostility).
:5 See 45 A.B.A. REP. 75 (1920).
a' See Ray, supra note 69, at 69-73 (reviewing history of section one exclusion); Bur-
stein, supra note 88, at 129-34 (same).
97 See id. (citing Proceedings of the 26th Annual Convention of the International
Seamen's Union of America 203 (1923)).
98 See Ray, supra note 69, at 72 (citing Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Conven-
tion of the American Federation of Labor 52 (1925)).
g9 See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1924).
10o See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 467 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("Congress heeded the resistance of organized labor .....
101 See Burstein, supra note 88, at 130.
102 See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The House Report stated that
the common law hostility to arbitration agreements was "too strongly fixed to be overturned
without legislative enactment." Id. Agreements to arbitrate under common law "were in
large part ineffectual, and the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry out
the arbitration agreement was without adequate remedy." S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1924); see Local 205, United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233
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debate, supports the conclusion that the Act was intended to cover
only commercial transactions.103 Since the legislative history
clearly indicates that the statute was intended to change the com-
mon law rule for commercial transactions only,104 a broad interpre-
tation of the exclusion for contracts of employment furthers this
intent.10 5
Moreover, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Gilmer,
stated that there was "little dispute" that the FAA was only appli-
cable to commercial situations and that the Supreme Court im-
pliedly has read the exclusion broadly."0 6 This statement, com-
bined with the Supreme Court's holding that the FAA was not
directly available in labor arbitration,0 7 supports a broader inter-
pretation of the statutory exclusion.
C. Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Claims
Outside the FAA
Assuming that all employment contracts may be excluded
from the FAA, it does not automatically follow that Congress in-
tended to preclude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in em-
ployment contracts. 08 Indeed, this view was impliedly rejected by
F.2d 85, 99 (1st Cir. 1956) (noting "tenor" of legislative history indicates congressional at-
tention focused on commercial arbitration).
103 See Burstein, supra note 88, at 130; Ray, supra note 69, at 73 (recognizing absence
of labor representatives at committee meetings supports assumption that labor's needs were
met by exclusion).
104 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1984) (FAA sought to overcome
common law hostility to arbitration and enforce agreements to arbitrate in state and federal
court); Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (noting FAA reversed "centu-
ries of judicial hostility to arbitration").
10" See Kernochan, supra note 72, at 346 (stating that objective of statutory interpreta-
tion is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent).
100 See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1659-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying in part on Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Lincoln Mills).
107 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). In dissent,
Justice Frankfurter noted the implicit rejection by the majority of the availability of the
FAA to enforce arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts, and stated that
the majority "also found that Congress by implication repealed its own statutory exemption
of collective bargaining agreements" in the FAA. Id. at 467-68. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
8 See Slawsky v. True Form Founds. Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-1822, 1991 WL 98906 (E.D.
Pa. June 4, 1991) (denying motion to dismiss and compel arbitration because arbitration
clause contained in individual contract of employment exempt from FAA). In Slawsky, the
court did not discuss why exclusion from the FAA therefore mandated ignoring the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Similarly, Justice Stevens, in Gilmer, apparently felt that a finding that
the FAA did not apply to Gilmer's employment contract led to the conclusion that arbitra-
tion of his claim would not be compelled. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Supreme Court's creation of a public policy exception to arbi-
tration in Gardner-Denver.109 If the FAA mandated non-enforce-
ment, a public policy exception would have been completely
unnecessary.
The more plausible conclusion is that the exclusion simply left
the common law rule against specific performance of arbitration
agreements undisturbed. Under this view, a federal court faced
with the need to determine whether or not an arbitration clause in
an employment contract is enforceable would not be bound by the
FAA's liberal policy favoring arbitration. Rather, the issue would
become the continued validity of the judicial hostility towards
arbitration.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,110 the Supreme
Court held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act was "federal law, which the courts must fashion from the pol-
icy of our national labor laws."'" The Court stated that Congress
had impliedly rejected "the common-law rule ... against enforce-
ment of executory agreements to arbitrate. 11 2 The Court, however,
specifically reserved the question "whether as a matter of federal
law executory agreements to arbitrate are enforceable, absent con-
gressional approval."" 3 Although recent cases have denounced ju-
dicial hostility towards arbitration,1 1 4 none have directly addressed
the continuing vitality of the common law rule under federal statu-
tory law. Given that arbitration is in essence a form of forum selec-
tion, it is submitted that in establishing the enforceability of forum
selection clauses, the Supreme Court has impliedly rejected the
common law hostility towards arbitration and would enforce an ar-
bitration agreement in the appropriate situation, even without ex-
press federal statutory authority.
In The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co.,'1 5 the Court reviewed
a forum selection clause in an international towage contract." 6 The
clause at issue provided that "dispute[s] arising must be treated
109 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing public policy exception to
arbitration).
1 0 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
. Id. at 456.
112 Id.
... Id. at 456 n.7.
"I See supra note 49 (discussing recent pro-arbitration trend).
115 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
"I See id. at 2.
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before the London Court of Justice.' 1 17 In deciding whether the
clause should be specifically enforced, l" 8 the Court determined that
forum selection clauses were prima facie valid and entitled to en-
forcement unless unreasonable under the circumstances." 9
The Court reasoned that judicial hostility towards such
clauses, grounded in views that they ousted the jurisdiction of the
court or were contrary to public policy, lacked serious support in
the law and was "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction."'120 En-
forcement of such clauses was merely the logical corollary to al-
lowing parties to consent in advance to the jurisdiction of a given
court, enabling notice to be served by the other party.12' Relying
further on principles of freedom of contract and contemporaneous
scholarly opinion,11 2 the Court dismissed judicial hostility as a
"provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals.' 123
Freed from this common law hostility, the Court proceeded to ana-
lyze the clause as it would any other clause in a contract.124
117 Id.
"0' See id. at 7-8. Zapata, a corporation based in Houston, TX, contracted with Un-
terweser, a German corporation, for the latter to tow Zapata's drilling rig from Louisiana to
Italy. Id. at 2. Using its deep sea tug, The Bremen, Unterweser undertook to complete the
contract. Id. at 3. The Bremen met high seas in international waters and the drilling rig was
damaged. Id. Zapata commenced suit in United States District Court in Tampa, and Un-
terweser invoked the forum clause and moved to dismiss. Id. at 4. The district court denied
the motion, and adhered to the traditional view that "agreements in advance of controversy
whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will
not be enforced." Id. at 6 (quoting Carbon Black Exports, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d
297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959)).
119 See id. at 10.
120 Id. at 12. The Court essentially adopted the view expressed in Judge Wisdom's dis-
senting opinion below. Id. at 10. In proposing a rule of reasonableness and not one of dis-
taste in evaluating forum clauses, Judge Wisdom labeled as "weak" the historical anteced-
ents of opposition to forum and arbitration clauses. See In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH,
428 F.2d 888, 902 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The proper focus for analyzing
forum clauses should be on the bargaining conditions of the parties and the remedy availa-
ble if the forum clause is enforced. Id. at 905 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
" See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10-11; see also National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhert, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (providing that party may consent to service of pro-
cess via an agent in jurisdiction where party cannot be found).
M See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 80 (1971). The Restatement provides that "[tihe parties' agreement as to the place
of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given
effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." Id.
'2 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
124 See id. The Court framed the issue as "whether... [the lower] court should have
exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the
parties, manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum
clause." Id. The Court found enforcement of the clause not to be unreasonable. Id. at 19.
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While the opinion doubtlessly reflected the facts of the case
and judicial policy colored by the realities of international trade,125
the reversal of common law hostility to choice of forum clauses was
expanded to arbitration clauses governing statutory claims in Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.126 Charac-
terizing an agreement to arbitrate as "a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute,' 127 the Court found
this policy to be reinforced by federal policy in favor of arbitra-
tion128 and held that antitrust disputes were subject to arbitration
under the FAA.129 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have inva-
riably followed this line of reasoning, reversing public policy excep-
tions to arbitration and enforcing arbitration clauses under the
FAA even when statutory rights were in issue. 130 It is submitted
that a court would reach the same conclusion even without the
FAA's liberal policy in favor of arbitration.
III. PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR CASES NOT GOVERNED BY THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Since predispute agreements to arbitrate federal statutory
claims contained in employment contracts are excluded from the
FAA but enforceable under the authority of Gilmer, a court must
decide what substantive law to apply when interpreting and en-
forcing such agreements. In these instances, since federal question
jurisdiction exists, federal substantive law governs in the first in-
stance.' If the statute conferring the substantive right precludes
1 2 Id. at 9-10. "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." Id.
at 9.
226 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
'2" Id. at 630 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)). Relying
mainly on The Bremen, the Court in Scherk enforced, pursuant to the FAA, an agreement
to arbitrate a dispute that arose from an international commercial transaction. See Scherk,
417 U.S. at 519-20.
128 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631. The Court explained that "federal policy
[in favor of arbitration] applies with special force in the field of international commerce."
Id.
:29 See id. at 640.
220 See, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 (ADEA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491-92
(1987) (wage claims under California Labor Code); supra note 49 (discussing recent pro-
arbitration trend).
131 See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Rules of Decision Act pro-
vides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
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arbitration either explicitly or implicitly, an agreement to arbitrate
would be unenforceable and the parties would be free to litigate.132
Federal civil rights and employment statutes, however, have not
mentioned arbitration. 133 In addition, recent cases have found no
conflict between arbitration and the underlying remedial purposes
of these statutes.1 3
4
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
When rights and duties are governed by the Constitution or federal statutes, the rule of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), does not apply. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
132 See Shell, supra note 69, at 565 (noting courts cannot enforce agreement to arbitrate
in contravention of congressional intent).
113 See id. at 565-66. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains a provision on alternative
means of dispute resolution. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat.
1071, 1081. This section provides:
[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facili-
tation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title.
Id. The House Report discussing this section emphasized that "the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided
by Title VII" and that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in
a... collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions." H.R. REP. No. 102-
40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (citing Gard-
ner-Denver with approval). At least one commentator has suggested that the provision con-
cerning alternative means of dispute resolution rendered questions regarding the application
of the FAA exclusion to individual employment contracts moot. See Gray, supra note 80, at
131 n.64, 131-32. Such a view, however, seems to disregard the express language of the stat-
ute which only "encourages" alternative means of dispute resolution "where appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law."
134 See supra notes 37-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gilmer). Although the
Court, in Gilmer, repeated the notion from Mitsubishi that "all statutory claims may not be
appropriate for arbitration," the Court nevertheless found the ADEA claim to be arbitrable.
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652. The Supreme Court has yet to find that arbitration posed an
inherent conflict to any statutory scheme. See supra note 49; cf. Bird v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 120-22 (2d Cir.) (on remand after Rodriguez, court found no
inherent conflict between ERISA and arbitration), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991);
Steele v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 701 F. Supp. 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no inherent conflict
between arbitration and Fair Labor Standards Act); supra note 61 (Title VII claims subject
to arbitration after Gilmer). But see Shell, supra note 3, at 566-72 (arguing that ERISA'
claims may be arbitrable but ADEA and Title VII claims are not); Edward M. Morgan,
Contract Theory and the Source of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitration Question, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1065-71 (1987) (suggesting a focus on the rights in issue to determine
arbitrability; rights flowing from individual interaction are arbitrable while rights created by
the government to further collective interests are not); Lieberman, supra note 35, at 1822
(proposing discrimination statutes should be presumed to override the FAA); Nicholas W.
Lobenthal, Note, The Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: Towards an Epistemology of Congres-
sional Silence, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 67, 68 (1989) (Congress intended ADEA claims
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Absent federal guidelines, it is submitted that a court should
apply state law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of
such agreements. For supplying decisional rules where a federal
scheme is lacking,1 3 5 the presumption rests in favor of adopting
state law. 3 ' The majority of states have adopted some form of the
Uniform Arbitration Act,3 7 which provides for broad enforcement
of arbitration agreements, including those contained in employ-
ment contracts.' Every other state has enacted some form of
commercial arbitration legislation.' As a result, well developed
to be non-arbitrable); Alison Brooke Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under The
Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 1137, 1156-57 (1986) (arbitrability inquiry should
focus on parties intent to submit particular issue to arbitration).
..5 See DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983)
(adopting state statute of limitations matter of discretion and not mandated by Erie or
Rules of Decision Act). Where a federal statute is silent concerning a particular issue, fed-
eral courts may "fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned ... [but] the range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). "Whenever the federal court is free to
decide for itself the rule to be applied.. . it is applying, or making, 'federal common law.'"
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 389 (4th ed. 1983). Examples of
areas where federal common law has developed include:
(1) admiralty and maritime cases; (2) interstate disputes; (3) proceedings raising
matters of international relations; (4) actions involving gaps in federal statutory
provisions; (5) cases concerning the legal relations and proprietary interests of the
United States.
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7, at 223 (1985). See generally Stewart
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1231 (1985) (summariz-
ing development of choice of law rules and federal common law).
M See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2778 (1991) (citing as usual rule use of state statute of limitations where Congress failed to
provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action). The presumption in favor of
state law recognizes "the logical utilization of local substantive law to solve local problems,
the preservation of important state policies, and the orderliness and certainty of application
of well-developed areas of state law." FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 135, § 4.7 at 223-24; see
Theresa C. O'Laughlin, Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Pro-
posed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 834-35 (1976) (establishing three part test for determin-
ing whether state law should be adopted); see also Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity
Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1429, 1446 (1960) (noting essential focus whether or not Congress in-
tended state law to apply).
"' See UNIF. ARBITRATIONAcT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (listing 34 states
and District of Columbia as having adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act).
138 See id.
See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to -16 (1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West
1982 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to -424 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-9-1 to -43 (Harrison 1990); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -15 (1976); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:4201 to :4217 (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to -37 (1972 & Supp.
1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1 to :10 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -.11 (West
1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1992);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (Baldwin 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.300-.365 (1991);
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state law exists to provide rules of decision in these instances.
If the state arbitration law was found to conflict with the fed-
eral statute at issue, however, a federal court would be free to fash-
ion a different rule of decision.14 0 A conflict would exist if the use
of state law nullified the purpose and the functioning of the federal
statutory program under consideration."" Since these statutes cre-
ate a right and provide a framework of judicial enforcement, 142 a
state arbitration statute allowing liberal access to a judicial forum
could hardly cause a conflict. Nevertheless, as evidenced by Gil-
mer, a state statute that restricts such access and meticulously en-
forces agreements to arbitrate will cause no conflict provided Con-
gress has not guaranteed a judicial forum under the statutory
scheme.1
43
Along with situations creating a conflict, a strong need for a
uniform federal rule may overcome the presumption in favor of
state law.144 Although the use of state law may lead to different
and disparate results based on each state's policies, 145 a sufficiently
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-1 to -21 (1985 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220
(West 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-10-1 to -8 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-.18 (West 1981
& Supp. 1991).
"o See Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778. In Lampf, the Court departed from the usual rule
and adopted a uniform limitations period for litigation under § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule 10B-5, noting that "when the operation of the state limitations
period would frustrate the policies embraced by the federal enactment, this Court has
looked to federal law for a suitable period." Id.; see also O'Laughlin, supra note 136, at 836
(noting conflict present when state law designed to thwart federal policy or limit federal
liability).
141 See, e.g., Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1188-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
state law denying recovery by estate for loss of life inconsistent with civil rights statute).
242 See, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653-54 (finding that Congress created but did not
guarantee judicial forum in ADEA).
143 See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (no conflict between ADEA and arbi-
tration); supra note 61 and accompanying text (Title VII claims subject to arbitration).
144 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-68 (1943) (creating fed-
eral common law to govern rights and duties of federal government on its commercial pa-
per); FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1474-76 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring uniform
rule governing transfers of letters of credit), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Lerakoli,
Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir.) (holding exclusively federal
scheme governing mail delivery required uniform liability rule for nondelivery of mail), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986).
1' See Recent Developments, Federal Arbitration Act Comparison, 1986 Mo. J. Disp.
REsOL. 143 (comparing FAA to state arbitration statutes); Recent Developments, The Uni-
form Arbitration Act, 1988 Mo. J. Disp. REsOL. 247 (summarizing state law developments).
Individual state variations on the Uniform Arbitration Act have excluded employment con-
tracts, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1990); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(b)
(1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(b)(2) (1991), collective bargaining agreements, see, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 802(A) (West Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (Supp. 1991);
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compelling need for uniformity to override the presumption in
favor of state law is not apparent.14 These are not situations in
which a uniform rule would aid administration of a federal pro-
gram. 4 ' State law is often used to complement and supplement
federal statutory schemes. 48 Moreover, uniformity for its own sake
is not enough to defeat the presumption in favor of state law.149
Although the FAA provides an established body of law from which
uniform standards could readily be established,15 0 the mere possi-
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
224(a) (West Supp. 1992), and contracts of adhesion, see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (Vernon
1992). In addition, some states substantially limit agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-101 (1973) (codifying common law rule against enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(a) & (b) (West 1987)
(agreements to arbitrate future disputes unenforceable in contracts of adhesion and employ-
ment contracts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c) (1991) (agreements to arbitrate future disputes
not enforceable in employment contracts); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-15-1 (1972) (allowing arbi-
tration of current disputes only). In situations not controlled by a particular state's arbitra-
tion legislation, common law rules will often apply and arbitration clauses will not be specif-
ically enforceable. See DoMKE, supra note 3, §§ 3:01 to :02; see also Kodak Mining Co. v.
Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Ky. 1984) (dictum) (noting common law rule no
longer valid in Kentucky).
4I See FDIC v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1989) (declining to create
priority for FDIC under federal statute). "Any rule fashioned must have its base on the goal
of effectuating congressional policy." Id. at 1546.
147 See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (utilizing state law to define
"children" under federal statute); see also O'Laughlin, supra note 136, at 841 (recognizing
that uniformity given greater weight where it creates administrative ease in operating a fed-
eral program).
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (allowing state law to supplement civil rights statutes).
Section 1988 establishes a three-step process for the selection of the appropriate
substantive law in civil rights actions. First, it is to be determined whether federal
civil rights law is deficient in that it fails to furnish a particular rule; if it is defi-
cient, the most closely analogous state law may fill the vacuum only if it is consis-
tent with the meaning and purpose of constitutional and federal statutory law. If
state law is inconsistent, it must be disregarded in favor of federal common law.
Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1188 (7th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740-41 (1979) (allowing state law to determine priority of liens
under federal statute); United States v. One Single Family Residence, 894 F.2d 1511, 1517-
20 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that state property law adequately effectuated policy of federal
criminal forfeiture statute).
149 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
150 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. Although section one of the FAA has
been interpreted to exclude collective bargaining agreements, federal courts have looked to
the FAA for guidance in labor arbitration cases. See supra note 67. The apparent incon-
gruity was tempered by the congressional mandate of section 301 of the LMRA, "em-
power[ing] federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern 'suits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization' under the federal labor
laws." United Paperworkers v Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (quoting Textile Workers
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bility of different and disparate results does not require departure
from the principles of federalism and nullify the presumption in
favor of state law.151
CONCLUSION
With the demise of public policy exceptions to arbitration and
the departure from dispelled judicial hostilities to arbitration, the
appropriateness of arbitration to resolve statutory claims rests on a
strong legal foundation. Where the arbitrability of a federal statu-
tory claim is not governed by the FAA, however, state arbitration
law should be adopted to govern the interpretation and enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate. Although federal courts possess
the power to develop a uniform rule under federal common law in
this situation, adoption of state law commands maximum defer-
ence to principles of federalism, while leaving ample breathing
room for judicial review and activism where state law is wholly in-
appropriate. This position provides fertile ground for growth in the
use of arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution by allowing
each state to develop its own policy concerning arbitration and by
avoiding negative implications from creating a mandatory federal
rule favoring arbitration.
Michael J. Gallagher
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957)); see Chicago Typographical Union v. Chi-
cago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504 (7th Cir. 1991) (FAA may be adopted for labor
arbitration in determining breach of agreement to arbitrate); Bacashihua v. United States
Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 1988) (adopting FAA statute of limitations for
claim to vacate arbitration award under LIRA section 301). But see Ray, supra note 69, at
63. Professor Ray reviewed the split in authority over whether the FAA applies to labor
arbitration, id. at 63-69, and concluded that the FAA's standard for reviewing arbitral
awards was inherently incompatible with the purposes and policies of labor arbitration, id.
at 90. Under the employment and civil rights statutes, however, there has been no similar
mandate to create federal common law.
151 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discre-
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 806
(1957) "[E]ven where state law might generally be adopted on an issue, it would be possible
to reject the rule of a particular state whose doctrine on the specific issue was not entirely
consistent with the federal objective ..... Id.
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